Washington Law Review
Volume 60

Number 3

6-1-1985

The Scope of Judicial Review of Agency Actions in Washington
Revisited—Doctrine, Analysis, and Proposed Revisions
Tim J. Filer

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Tim J. Filer, Comment, The Scope of Judicial Review of Agency Actions in Washington
Revisited—Doctrine, Analysis, and Proposed Revisions, 60 Wash. L. Rev. 653 (1985).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol60/iss3/12

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY
ACTIONS IN WASHINGTON REVISITEDDOCTRINE, ANALYSIS, AND PROPOSED
REVISIONS
The most complex problem in administrative law is defining the scope of
judicial review for administrative agency actions. I The key to this problem
is the concept of deference: 2 when, and to what extent, is judicial intervention into agency decisionmaking justified to achieve a proper allocation of
expertise between courts and agencies.3 A proper understanding of this
court-agency relationship is especially important because the Washington
Supreme Court has interpreted the state constitution to allow broad delega4
tions of legislative power to administrative agencies.
This Comment analyzes current Washington law on the scope of judicial
review, and compares it to recently proposed revisions to the Washington
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 5 Part I discusses the doctrine surrounding the review of agency actions by Washington courts. Part II
examines Washington case law and identifies several elements that determine the intensity with which the court will examine a particular agency
action, regardless of the doctrinally prescribed deference. Part III compares and discusses the proposed revisions to the Washington APA. While
based primarily on the latest Model State APA, 6 the proposed revisions
1. Andersen, Judicial Review of Agency Fact-Finding in Washington: A Brief Comment, 13
WILLAMETrE L.J. 397, 397 (1977). Legislatures impose minimum procedural requirements on administrative agencies, which implement broad statutory policies, by adopting Administrative Procedures
Acts [APAs]. See Bonfield & Levinson, An Introductionto the Model State Administrative Procedure
Act (pts. 1 & 2), 34 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 13, at 1 (1982). The scope of review sections of these APAs
describe the relationship desired by legislatures for courts and agencies. See WASHINGTON STATE BAR
Ass'N ADMIN. LAW TASK FORCE, PROPOSED REVISIONS WASHINGTON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT,
1-3 (introductory comment) (1984) [hereinafter cited as WASH. PROPOSAL].
2. Brodie & Linde, State CourtReview ofAdministrativeAction: Prescribingthe Scope ofReview,
1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 537, 538.
3. Abrahams, Scope ofReview ofAdministrative Action in Washington:A Proposal,14 GONZ. L.
REV. 75, 78 (1978).
4. Barry & Barry, Inc. v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 81 Wn. 2d 155, 161, 500 P.2d 540,
543-44 (1972). A delegation of legislative authority to an administrative agency will be upheld when (1)
it can be shown that the legislature has provided standards defining in general terms what is to be done
and which administrative agency is to do it and, (2) sufficient procedural safeguards exist to control
arbitrary agency action and prevent abuses of discretionary power. Id. at 159, 500 P.2d at 542-43. See
generally 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 210-12 (1978).
5.

WASH. PROPOSAL, supra note 1.

6. MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURES ACT (National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, 1981) [hereinafter cited as MODEL ACT]. Bonfield & Levinson, supra note 1, provide a
succinct discussion of the new Model Act and its underlying purposes and assumptions. The previous
versions of the Model Act, first promulgated in 1946 and revised in 1961, have had great impact on state
APAs. The Uniform Commissioners list 30 states, including Washington, that have adopted APAs
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contain some significant variations. The Comment concludes that the
proposed revisions are a necessary step forward and should be adopted by
the Washington legislature.
I.

TRADITIONAL DOCTRINE

A.

Goals of a JudicialReview Statute

The legislature's primary goal in drafting APA judicial review standards
should be clarity. Three factors contribute to the achievement of this goal.
First, the review standards should be set forth in clear language. The courts'
function in applying standards should be apparent from the statute. Second, the language and the legislative history of an APA7 must clearly
establish the types of questions reviewable by courts and the appropriate
review standards for each type of question. 8 Third, the standards should
indicate when courts should defer to the views espoused by agencies. From
the courts' point of view, specific and detailed standards encourage structured case analysis and give substance to terms such as "arbitrary and
capricious. "
The secondary goals for APA scope of review sections are uniformity and
predictability. These two goals require a system of judicial review that
allows an accurate prediction of the situations in which courts will substitute their judgment for that of agencies. 10 From the standpoint of a legal
practitioner, the accuracy of these predictions is crucial in providing
dependable legal advice to clients.
B.

JudicialReview of Agency Adjudications

The traditional basis for determining the standard of review of agency
adjudications is the distinction between questions of fact and questions of
based substantially on the previous Model Acts. See 14 U.L.A. 171 (Supp. 1985).
The Washington Proposal's structure parallels that of the 1981 Model Act. Part I (General Provisions), contains definitions and states that the APA should be construed to create only procedural rights.
Part II (Public Access to Agency Rules), and Part III (Rulemaking Procedures), both reflect the drafters'
effort to ensure public participation in rulemaking, to "assure that rulemaking determinations are
democratic as well as technocratic." Bonfield & Levinson (pt. 1), supra note 1, at 7. Part IV
(Adjudicative Proceedings), governs the quasi-judicial determination of legal rights by agencies. Part V
(Judicial Review and Civil Enforcement), and particularly § 85, which deals with the scope of judicial
review, is the primary focus of this Comment. In the words of the Task Force, this section is "central
. . .since it deals with the ultimate relationship between the courts and the adminstrative agencies."
WASH. PROPOSAL, supra note 1, § 85 comment.
7.

See generally L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 619 (1965) (choice of

standard is up to the legislature, and courts should respect that choice); Andersen, supra note 1, at 416
(legislative history should be unambiguous).
8. See Abrahams, supra note 3, at 77.
9. Brodie & Linde, supra note 2, at 560.
10. Franklin County v. Sellers, 97 Wn. 2d 317, 323 n. 1, 646 P.2d 113, 116 n. 1 (1982); Abrahams,
supra note 3, at 87.

Washington Scope of Review
law. 1' The reviewing court defers to agency findings of fact, 12 while
deciding questions of law independently of the agency's position. 13
In many cases, however, the court will not only determine the meaning
of the applicable statute or regulation, but will also review the agency's
application of the law to a given set of facts. The court reviews these
"mixed questions of law and fact"'14 as questions of law, 15 and thus may
11. Washington doctrine regarding the judicial review of agency adjudications has passed through
three generations. The first occurred before the passage of Washington's APA in 1959. A chaotic jumble
of statutes and review standards characterized this period. See Peck, Scope ofReview in Washington, 33
WASH. L. REv. 55 (1958) (providing a description of the statutes and standards of review that existed
during this period).
In the second generation, spanning the period from 1959 to 1982, courts began reviewing agency
actions under the standards in the state APA. The APA's scope of review section is codified at WASH.
REv. CODE § 34.04.130(6) (1983). It provides:
The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings; or it
may reverse the decision if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced
because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional provisions; or
(b) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; or
(d) affected by other error of law; or
(e)clearly erroneous in view of the entire record as submitted and the public policy contained in
the act of the legislature authorizing the decision or order; or
(f) arbitrary or capricious.
For contemporaneous academic comment on the APA, see Peck & Trautman, Comment on Washington
Legislation-1959,Administrative Law, 34 WASH. L. REV. 281 (1959); Schwartz, The Model State
Administrative ProceduresAct, 33 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1958). As enacted, Washington's APA was
substantially similar to the 1946 and 1961 versions of the Model State APAs. Professor Davis critiques
the 1961 Model Act in 1 K. DAvis, supra note 4, at 37-51.
The third and present generation ofdoctrinal analysis began with Franklin County v. Sellers, 97 Wn.
2d 317, 646 P.2d 113 (1982). It is characterized by the Washington Supreme Court's clarification of
which of the statutory standards will apply to the various questions encountered in the judicial review of
agency actions.
12. A finding of fact is defined as "the assertion that a phenomenon has happened or is or will be
happening independent of or anterior to any assertion as to its legal effect." L. JAFFE, supranote 7, at
548. The agency is seen as the primary actor in the process of finding facts, and in laying the factual
basis for the application of a predetermined standard oflaw. See id. at 551. In reviewing agency findings
of fact, the court makes a legal determination whether there is enough evidence to support the findings
made by the agency. This is a deferential standard. See id. at 552-53. The traditional way of expressing
this deference to agency factfinding is that courts are prohibited from substituting their judgment for
that of the agency in factual matters. See, e.g., Ancheta v. Daly, 77 Wn. 2d 255, 260,461 P.2d 531, 534
(1969).
13. When reviewing the conclusions of law made by an agency, the court is free to substitute its
interpretation of the law for that of the agency because interpreting the law is the court's area of
expertise. Indeed, the reviewing court has a duty to declare the meaning of the statute or regulation
under consideration. L. JAF'E, supra note 7, at 575.
14. NLRB v. Marcus Trucking Corp., 286 F.2d 583, 590-91 (2d Cir. 1961), cited with approvalin
Leschi Improvement Council v. State Highway Comm'n, 84 Wn. 2d 271, 283, 525 P.2d 774, 783
(1974). Mixed questions of law and fact are defined as "cases where there is a dispute both as to the
propriety of the inferences drawn by the agency from the raw facts and as to the meaning of the statutory
term." Marcus Trucking Corp., 286 F.2d at 590-91.
15. L. JAFFE, supra note 7, at 554. Overton v. Economic Assistance Auth., 96 Wn. 2d 552, 555,

Washington Law Review

Vol. 60:653, 1985

substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Yet, some deference to
agency applications of law is necessary to ensure that the agency has
sufficient flexibility to perform its duties. If the agency's application of law
was reasonable, it should be upheld. 16
17
The Washington Supreme Court in Franklin Count), v. Sellers,
provided a recent statement of this doctrinal framework. In Sellers, the
court acknowledged that its earlier applications of the APA's standards for
review had demonstrated a "lack of consistency" and that clarification was
needed. 18 The court recognized that legal practitioners face the key problem of trying to predict when the courts will substitute their judgment for
that of agencies. 19 In addressing this problem, the court discussed the
proper scope of judicial review for questions of fact, questions of law, and
mixed questions of law and fact.
The court in Sellers carefully defined and limited the range of state court
inquiry when reviewing agency factfinding. The reviewing court is to
search the entire record for evidence both supporting and weighing against
the finding of fact, 20 and is to reject the finding if it is "clearly erroneous."
Only findings of fact are reviewed under this standard. 2'
637 P.2d 652, 654 (1981).
16. Many commentators agree that agency determinations of law should be given some deference.
See, e.g., Abrahams, supra note 3, at 78 (agency applications of law should be reviewed under the
arbitrary and capricious standard as long as the law applied falls within the agency's area of special
expertise): Comment, Perfecting the Partnership: Structuring the Judicial Control of Administrative
DeterminationsofQuestions ofLaiv, 31 VAD.L. REV. 91,93 (1978) (arguing that courts should apply a
deferential abuse of discretion standard ofjudicial review to agency determinations of law). See also L.
JAFFE, supra note 7, at 572 (if an agency determination of law is reasonable and does not contravene the
"clear purpose" of the statute, the courts should defer to the agency's view).
17. 97 Wn. 2d 317, 646 P.2d 113 (1982).
18. Id. at 323 n. 1,646 P.2d at 116 n. 1. The court cited Abrahams, supra note 3.
19. Sellers, 97 Wn. 2d 323 n. l, 646 P.2d at 116 n .
20. Id. at 324, 646 P.2d at 116. The court cited Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474
(1950), and WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.130(6)(e) (1983) (clearly erroneous test to be applied "in view
of the entire record"), as requiring this search. Compare with this Professor Andersen's criticism that
the Washington court was previously operating under a "fundamental misconception" that it need only
search the record for evidence supporting the agency's finding when applying the substantial evidence
test. This standard was replaced with the present clearly erroneous test in 1967. Andersen, supra note 1.
at 411. It is important that the court continue to examine the whole record, since the Washington
Proposal, if adopted, would restore the substantial evidence test. See WASH. PROPOSAL, supra note 1.
§ 8 5(3)(g); see also infra note 103.
21. See Renton Educ. Ass'n v. Public Employment Relations Comm'n, 101 Wn.2d 435, 440, 680
P.2d 40, 44 (1984) (Sellers holds that factual determinations must be upheld under clearly erroneous
test unless court left with definite and firm conviction of mistake).
The Sellers court cited with approval the definition of the clearly erroneous test adopted in Ancheta v.
Daly, 77 Wn. 2d at 259-60, 461 P.2d at 534 (1969), which allows a court to overturn an agency
factfinding when "although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." 97 Wn. 2d at 324. 646
P.2d at 116. This formulation was first announced in United States v. U.S. Gypsum, 333 U.S. 364. 395
(1948).

Washington Scope of Review
The court's approach in Sellers represents an implicit rejection of the
past practice of applying the clearly erroneous test to agency action as a
whole.22 Before Sellers, the court overturned agency actions when it was
left with the "definite and firm conviction" that the agency had made a
mistake. 23 Such review is not the narrow review of agency factfinding
authorized by the clearly erroneous test. 24 Application of the test as defined
in Sellers should result in agency factfinding receiving the proper deference, and clarify for lower courts, agencies, and private litigants the weight
such findings will receive on judicial review.
The Sellers court adopted a partnership approach for reviewing questions of law. 25 Under the "error of law" standard provided by the Washington APA, 26 the reviewing court is free to exercise its independent judgment
in resolving questions of law. But while the court is the final arbiter of the
law's meaning, the Sellers court recognized that the view of the agency
should be given substantial weight. 27
22. Abrahams, supra note 3, at 85-87, 91-99 and Andersen, supra note 1, at 407-12, discuss the
deficiencies in the major Washington cases through 1977. The same criticisms can be leveled against the
case law between 1977 and the Sellers decision in 1982. See infra note 23. Professor Abrahams lays
some of the blame for the confusion on the present statute, which gives no indication of the types of
questions that are to be reviewed under its standards. He views its amendment as the proper cure. See
Abrahams, supra note 3, at 79-80.
23. See, e.g., Overton v. Economic Assistance Auth., 96 Wn. 2d 552, 556, 637 P.26f652, 655
(1981) (the trial court was correct in overturning an agency decision only if it "was clearly erroneous,
arbitraryand capricious, or a result of an errorof law") (emphasis in original); Weyerhaeuser Co. v.
Southwest Air Pollution Auth., 91 Wn. 2d 77, 84, 586 P.2d 1163, 1167 (1978) (holding the Pollution
Authority's application of certain standards to one of Weyerhaeuser's mills was not "clearly erroneous").
24. The court at one point recognized the limited applicability of the clearly erroneous test. In
Leschi Improvement Council v. State Highway Comm'n, 84 Wn. 2d 271, 282 (1974), the court stated
that "[t]he clearly erroneous test is, of course, not applicable to the review of questions of law." (Note:
Pacific Reporter 525 P.2d 774,783 (1974) contains different language). Unfortunately, the court did not
follow this declaration in later cases.
Professor Andersen's concept of "intensity" is a useful description of how courts review agency
factfinding. Andersen, supra note 1, at 400. A more "intensive" standard of review allows a court more
freedom to substitute its judgment for that of the agency (e.g., the clearly erroneous test). Conversely, a
less "intensive" standard diminishes this freedom, increasing the deference given to agency factfinding
(e.g., the substantial evidence test). Contra 2 F COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 726-28 (1965)
(arguing that while the tests are logically distinct, they are indistinguishable in application). The
legislature is free to prescribe any point along the "intensity" scale when it drafts the standard for
judicial review of agency factfinding. However, the legislative history and the language of the statute
itself should clearly indicate what level of intensity is desired. Andersen, supra note 1, at 416.
Additionally, both the clearly erroneous and substantial evidence tests are "middle-ground" standards;
neither of them authorizes a court to disregard an agency's finding of fact. Id. at 402-03.
25. 97 Wn. 2d at 325, 646 P.2d at 117. See generally L. JAFFE, supra note 7, at 546; Abrahams,
supra note 3, at 76, 88-90 (view reached without application of specialized expertise should receive no
deference, but agency interpretations and applications of law utilizing expertise should receive
deferential review); Comment, supra note 16, at 92-93.
26. WASH. REv. CODE § 34.04.130(6)(d) (1983); see supra note 11.
27. 97 Wn. 2d at 325-26, 646 P.2d at 117. The court cited with approval Overton v. Economic
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Under Sellers, the court reviews mixed questions of law and fact as
questions of law.28 The court conducts the review on two levels. The factual

component is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. 29 The Sellers
court expressly disapproved the practice of reviewing questions of fact de
novo in cases presenting mixed questions of law and fact; courts should not
substitute their judgment for the agency's in factual matters. 30 The legal
component is reviewed under the error of law standard, and the court is free
to substitute its judgment for the agency's. 3' As long as the agency
"applied the correct law to facts which were not clearly erroneous," '32 its
33
decision will be upheld.
C.

JudicialReview of Rules

Washington courts review rules that have been adopted by agencies
exercising their quasi-legislative powers, under several well-defined doctrinal standards. First, because agencies are created by statute, they may
only exercise such powers as are expressly granted or necessarily implied
Assistance Auth., 96 Wn. 2d 552, 555, 637 P.2d 652, 654 (1981) (agency's construction of statute
should be given substantial weight if in the agency's field of expertise, but court retains final authority to
declare meaning of the law).
28. 97 Wn. 2d at 330, 646 P.2d at 119. The court reiterated its previous holding that it could review
such questions without regard to the agency's decision. See Daily Herald Co. v. Department of
Employment Sec., 91 Wn. 2d 559, 562, 588 P.2d 1157, 1159 (1979).
29. 97 Wn. 2d at 330, 646 P.2d at 119.
30. Id. at 325. 646 P.2d at 117; see Ancheta v. Daly, 77 Wn. 2d at 260, 461 P.2d at 534. See
generally L. JAFFE, supra note 7, at 579-84.
31. Sellers, 97 Wn. 2d at 330, 646 P.2d at 119. While the court is free to substitute its judgment for
that of the agency, agency views will be given substantial weight. See supra note 27 and accompanying
text.
32. 97 Wn. 2d at 329, 646 P.2d at 119.
33. In Washington, appellate courts perform the same task as the trial court when reviewing an
agency action. The appellate court gives no deference to the lower court's ruling. Instead, the appellate
court directly reviews the administrative record, not the record of the trial court. See Farm Supply
Distrib. v. Washington Utilities &Transp. Comm'n, 83 Wn. 2d446,448, 518 P.2d 1237, 1238 (1974).
This rule differs from the rule in the federal courts. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474 (1950).
The reason for the difference between the Washington and federal rules is not clear. The federal rule
apparently implements a policy of finality; by giving a narrower review to lower court findings, the
continued substitution of judgment is discouraged. Andersen, supra note 1, at 414. In contrast, the
Washington court's primary concern in adopting the present rule was ensuring that agency determinations received the proper deference. Farm Supply, 83 Wn. 2d at 448, 518 P.2d at 1238-39. Appellate
courts have more experience in reviewing written records, and tend to focus on broader themes than do
trial courts. Thus, the appellate courts are presumably more qualified than trial courts to review agency
actions. In order to guarantee that appropriate deference is granted, appellate courts will stand in the
shoes of the trial court when reviewing agency actions.
Professor Andersen has criticized Washington's rule as being an inefficient allocation of judicial
resources, since it encourages "second and third level judicial review." Andersen. supra note 1,at 415.
While these criticisms are well taken, the rule seems firmly entrenched in Washington law.
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from the statutory grant of authority. 34 Thus, while the agency may pass
rules that are needed to "fill in the gaps" of a general statutory scheme, 35 it
36
may not promulgate rules that change or amend the implemented statutes.
Second, substantive agency rules are given a presumption of validity, 37 and
the person challenging a rule must prove that the rule is not reasonably
consistent with the purpose of the underlying statute.38 Finally, if an agency
rule has been adopted without following required and lawful procedures, it
39
will be invalidated regardless of its content.
D.

JudicialReview of Informal Agency Actions

In Washington, courts may review all administrative actions using the
arbitrary and capricious standard. 40 The supreme court has held that the
right to be free from arbitrary and capricious administrative action is a
fundamental right, 4 1 and that the courts have inherent constitutional power
to review any agency action to ensure that it is not arbitrary or capricious. 42
34. Anderson, Leech & Morse, Inc. v. Liquor Control Bd., 89 Wn. 2d 688, 694,575 P.2d 221,225
(1978).
35. - Hama Hama Construction Co. v. Shorelines Hearings Bd., 85 Wn. 2d 441,448,536 P.2d 157,
161-62 (1975).
'36. Fahn v. Cowlitz County, 93 Wn. 2d 368, 374, 610 P.2d 857, 860 (1980).
37. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Department of Ecology, 86 Wn. 2d 310, 314, 545 P.2d 5, 8 (1976). See
Levin & Woodward, In Defense of Deference:JudicialReview of AdministrativeAction, 31 ADMIN. L.
REv. 329 (1979). Levin & Woodward list several factors supporting the presumption of validity of
agency regulations as well as deference to agency interpretations of law. These factors include the
duration of the construction, the agency interpreting the meaning, implicit legislative approval,
consistency with judicial interpretation, and the technical complexity of the subject matter. Id.
One additional consideration should be whether the agency's interpretation of the law most effectively implements the public policy underlying the statute or regulation. If so, courts should defer. See
L. JAFFE, supra note 7, at 572.
38. See Bazan v. Department of Social & Health Serv., 26 Wn. App. 16, 24, 612 P.2d 413, 418
(1980), appealdismissed, 99 Wn. 2d 1011 (1981).
39. 2 F. COOPER, supra note 24, at 786. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.070 (1983) is a typical
declaratory order statute, authorizing courts to rule on the validity of agency rules when they are
challenged by persons who will or might be prejudiced by the application of the rules.
40. The arbitrary and capricious standard is most often applied in the review of informal agency
actions, i.e., those actions other than rulemaking and adjudicatory decisions. See, e.g., United Parcel
Serv. v. Department of Revenue, 102 Wn. 2d 355, 363-65,687 P.2d 186, 191-93 (1984) (the decision to
subject delivery trucks to the state use tax by determining whether they crossed state lines in more than
25% of their trips); Schuh v. Department of Ecology, 100 Wn. 2d 180, 186, 667 P.2d 64, 67-68 (1983)
(the decision to deny an original application for a water permit).
Professor Cooper cites the following as examples of informal agency actions that reviewing courts
have declared arbitrary or capricious: the denial of licenses to entitled applicants; the refusal to allow a
carrier to transport asphalt, even though a certificate allowed the carrier to do so; and the contravention
of a direct statutory command to set a quota for retail liquor licenses in a city. 2 F. COOPER, supranote
24, at 761-63.
41. Williams v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 97 Wn. 2d 215,221-22,643 P.2d 426,430-31(1982).
42. Pierce County v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 98 Wn. 2d 690, 693-94, 658 P.2d 648, 650-51. The
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Moreover, the courts have jurisdiction to exercise this type of review even in

43
the face of an explicit statutory prohibition of court appeals.
The arbitrary and capricious test is quite deferential to the agency.
Agency action is arbitrary and capricious if there is no support in the record
for the action. 44 An agency action is not arbitrary and capricious when
there is room for two opinions, despite a belief on the part of the reviewing
45
court that the agency reached an erroneous conclusion.

II.

DOCTRINE OR NO DOCTRINE-TRENDS IN WASHINGTON
CASE LAW ON JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTION

Despite the well-defined doctrinal framework discussed above, an examination of the case law in Washington shows that courts do not always give
agency actions the deference prescribed by the various standards of review.
46
While the courts define their functions in terms of the standards of review,
the cases show a varying intensity of review that depends not on the
applicable standard of review, but rather on the particular combination of
facts, statutes, regulations, and underlying public policies in an individual
case. The discussion below identifies the broad factors the courts consider
and how the interplay of those factors affects the deference courts give to
agency actions.
A.

TraditionalJudicialFunctions

A recurrent theme in the case law is the court's retention of traditional
judicial functions. Despite the grant of substantial weight to the agency
view under the error of law standard, 47 the court usually asserts its final
court stated that there are three sources of authority for judicial review of agency action: (I) statutes
specifically authorizing review; (2) statutory writ of certiorari; and (3) the "inherent constitutional
power" of the courts to review agency actions violative of fundamental rights. Id.
43. Williams, 97 Wn. 2d at 218,643 P.2d at 429. The court held that a statutory prohibition simply
removed the statutory authorization to conduct judicial review; the constitutional right to review still
remained.
44. Barrie v. Boundary Review Bd., 97 Wn. 2d 232, 236, 643 P.2d 433, 436 (1982) (applying

arbitrary and capricious standard in the exercise of its inherent power); Hayes v. Yount, 87 Wn. 2d 280.
286, 552 P.2d 1038, 1042 (1976) (applying the arbitrary and capricious standard from the state APA).
45. Pierce County v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 98 Wn. 2d at 695, 658 P.2d at 652 (quoting State v.
Rowe, 93 Wn. 2d 277,284,609 P,2d 1348, 1351(1980)); see Schuh v. Department of Ecology. 100 Wn.
2d 180, 186, 667 P.2d 64, 68 (1983) (a clear abuse of discretion maybe shown by demonstrating that the

agency exercised discretion in a manner that was manifestly unreasonable, exercised on untenable
grounds, or exercised for untenable reasons).
46. In discussing the inherently malleable distinction between fact and law, it is commonly stated
that "Itihe knife of policy alone effects an artificial cleavage at the point where the court chooses to draw
the line between public interest and private right." B. ScHwARTz, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 643 (1976)
(quoting F. DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW INTHE UNITED STATES 55
(1927)).
47. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
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authority to declare what the law is, regardless of the position taken by the
agency. 48 Thus, the court has prohibited administrative agencies from
adjudging the constitutionality of the statutes they administer. 49 Additionally, the court has ignored the agency view when a question was
50
determined under common law principles.
The most strenuously asserted power is the court's ability to exercise
independent judgment in determining the proper meaning or application of
a statute. For example, the court has rejected the responsible agency's
interpretation of the statutory exceptions to the labor dispute disqualification for unemployment benefits, 51 and has rejected an agency's taxation of
52
certain payments as gross income under the business and occupation tax.
This is a proper exercise of judicial expertise, and a necessary restraint on
agency discretion.
In addition, the court has reviewed with special intensity claims that an
agency's action exceeds its statutory powers. Thus, it held it was beyond the
necessarily implied powers of the Department of Social and Health Ser53
vices (DSHS) to determine parentage for support obligation purposes,
although the agency's statutes did empower it to charge parents for the
partial cost of foster care for their handicapped child. 54 Likewise, the
Human Rights Commission may not award monetary damages for humiliation and mental suffering, 55 but may prohibit preemployment inquiries
regarding the height of the applicant because such action furthers the
56
agency's broad remedial purpose.
The court also has conducted intensive review of claims that the agency
rules exceed its statutory authority. If the rule directly contradicts the
statute it implements, it is invalid. 57 Moreover, if the agency statute is
48. See, e.g., Overton v. Economic Assistance Auth., 96 Wn. 2d 552, 555, 637 P.2d 652, 654
(198 1) (agency interpretation upheld, but court careful to retain its power to make final declaration).
49. Bare v. Gorton, 84 Wn. 2d 380, 383, 526 P.2d 379, 381 (1974).
50. See, e.g., Department of Revenue v. Boeing Co., 85 Wn. 2d 663, 666-67, 538 P.2d 505,
507-08 (1975).
51. Employees of Pacific Maritime Ass'n v. Hutt, 88 Wn. 2d426,434-37,562 P.2d 1264,1269-71
(1977).
52. Walthew v. Department of Revenue, 103 Wn. 2d 183, 186-87, 691 P.2d 559, 561-62 (1984).
53. Taylor v. Morris, 88 Wn. 2d 586, 592, 564 P.2d 795, 798 (1977).
54. Griffin v. Department of Social & Health Serv., 91 Wn. 2d 616,624,590 P.2d 816, 821 (1979).
55. Human Rights Comm'n v. Cheney School Dist., 97 Wn. 2d 118, 126-27, 641 P.2d 163, 167
(1982).
56. Fahn v. Cowlitz County, 93 Wn. 2d 368, 376-82, 610 P.2d 857, 862-65 (1980) (agency may
prohibit pre-employment inquiries about height of applicant, though regulations invalidated for placing
too heavy a burden of proof on employers to show height is a valid job qualification).
57. See, e.g., Baker v. Morris, 84 Wn. 2d 804, 809, 529 P.2d 1091, 1094 (1974) (regulation
requiring six votes to waive mandatory minimum sentence invalid because authorizing statute required
only four votes).
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unconstitutionally vague, it will not be saved by any clarification found in
58
the regulation.
Additionally, the court has closely examined agency actions involving
public policies of particular concern to the legislature. One such policy is
the collection of tax revenues. To implement this policy, tax exemptions are
narrowly construed. 59 Thus, the court upheld agency regulations that
decreased the percentage of the cost of installing pollution control equipment allowable as a tax exemption. 60 The court has also upheld agency
61
adjudications imposing liability under the unemployment insurance tax.
However, the court has given relief to individuals from agency-imposed tax
liabilities that are not justified under the applicable statute. 62
63
Protection of the environment is another important legislative policy
that the court has enforced rigorously. Thus, despite recognizing that the
clearly erroneous test applies only to questions of fact, 64 the court adopted
that test for the review of agency determinations that a project did not
require an environmental impact statement. 65 The adopted test provided a
more intensive scope of review than the arbitrary and capricious test, and
the court used the adopted test to provide a judicial check on attempts to
short-circuit the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA) decisionmaking
process. 66 As a result, negative threshold determinations made under SEPA
by development-minded officials are examined closely by the supreme
court. 67 Additionally, the court has required close compliance with the
58. Public Disclosure Comm'n v. Rains, 87 Wn. 2d 626, 631-33, 555 P.2d 1368, 1372-73 (1976).
59. Overton v. Economic Assistance Auth., 96 Wn. 2d 552, 556, 637 P.2d 652, 655 (1981). This
case may also reflect the influence of subsequent legislative approval, see infra notes 99-100, as the
statute was amended to adopt the administrative interpretation before the supreme court decided this
case. See Overton, 96 Wn. 2d at 556-67, 637 P.2d at 655.
60. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Department of Ecology, 86 Wn. 2d 310, 317-18, 545 P.2d 5, 10 (1976).
Cf.International Paper Co. v. Department of Revenue, 92Wn. 2d 277, 280-81,595 P.2d 1310,1311-12
(1979) (court rejected both parties' interpretation of the statute and adopted an intermediate interpretation of when period for filing for tax exemptions and credits begins to run).
61. Schuffenhauer v. Department of Employment Sec., 86 Wn. 2d 233, 238-40, 543 P.2d 343,
347-48 (1975); see alsoDaily Herald Co. v. Department of Employment Sec., 91 Wn. 2d 559,564-65,
588 P.2d 1157, 1161 (1979).
62. Walthew v. Department of Revenue, 103 Wn. 2d 183, 186, 691 P.2d 559,561 (1984) (litigation
costs paid by law firm and passed straight through for reimbursement by client not gross income for
purposes of the business and occupations tax); Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 90 Wn.
2d 191, 193-95, 580 P.2d 262, 263-64 (1978) (plane flown into Washington by Oregon-based firm on
eight days over three month period not subject to Washington use tax).
63. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 43.21C.010 (1984) (SEPA preamble). See generally Rodgers,
The Washington Environmental Policy Act, 60 WASH. L. REv. 33, 34-35 (1984).
64. Leschi Improvement Council v. State Highway Comm'n, 84 Wn. 2d 271, 283, 525 P.2d 774,
782 (1974); see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
65. Norway Hill Assoc. v. King County Council, 87 Wn. 2d 267, 275, 552 P.2d 674, 679 (1976).
66. See id.
67. See, e.g., ASARCO, Inc. v. Air Quality Coalition, 92 Wn. 2d 685, 704-05, 601 P.2d 501, 514
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procedures for obtaining substantial development permits under the
68
Shoreline Management Act from agencies and applicants.
B.

Sphere ofAgency Functions

While reserving certain functions to itself, the court also has recognized
a sphere of legitimate decisionmaking authority for administrative agencies. Within this sphere there are three classes of cases. First, in some cases
the court has exercised its statutory interpretation function, and then
remanded the case to the agency for reconsideration of how the proper
interpretation applies to the facts. Second, the court has been deferential in
some cases toward the means chosen by agencies in performing their
mandated duties, as long as those means are within the agency's statutory
range of discretion. Third, greater deference is usually found in cases
involving agencies that have greater expertise than the court in the area
considered.
In the first class of cases, the court determines that the agency has
considered the case under an erroneous interpretation of the applicable
statute, 69 or has applied an inappropriate statute or regulation. 70 Once this
error is corrected, the court remands the case to the agency 7 1 so that it may
reconsider its decision and correctly apply its expertise. Questions remanded have included the proper amount of tax credits for newly installed
pollution control equipment, 72 the proper classification of a contract
(1979) (granting five year variance that would allow ASARCO to exceed emission limits requires
environmental impact statement); Swift v. Island County Comm'n, 87 Wn. 2d 348,360,552 P.2d 175,
182 (1976). But see Save a Neighborhood Environment (SANE) v. Seattle, 101 Wn. 2d 280, 283-84,
676 P.2d 1006, 1008-09 (1984) (new negative threshold determination not required for revised project
proposal that was substantially similar to previous proposal, when first negative threshold determination not appealed). See generally Rodgers, supra note 63, at 40-43.
68. See, e.g., Skagit County v. Department of Ecology, 93 Wn. 2d 742,746-47,613 P.2d 115,118
(1980) (portion of permit allowing dredge spoil to be dumped on site that had not been properly
designated was invalidated by the court). But see Nisqually Delta Ass'n v. City of Dupont, 103 Wn. 2d
720, 696 P.2d 1222 (1985) (where adequacy of final EIS not appealed, but actual location of log
transport dock overlapped the preferred and alternate locations, agency decision to allow the dock was
upheld despite challenges that inadequate notice was given to the public regarding the changed site, and
that the dock would violate the City of Dupont's shorelines master program).
69. See, e.g., Farm Supply Distrib., Inc. v. Utilities &Transp. Comm'n, 83 Wn. 2d 446,450, 518
P.2d 1237, 1239 (1974) (Commission had misinterpreted statutory definition of "contract carrier").
70. See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. v. Meyering, 102 Wn. 2d 385, 395, 687 P.2d 195, 201-02 (1984)
(Department of Employment Security treated case as a discharge, applied WASH. REv. CODE
§ 50.20.050 (1983), and granted benefits; court found facts arguably constituted voluntary resignation
and remanded for reconsideration under proper section of the statute).
71. Courts are authorized to remand to the agency for further proceedings under WASH. REv. CODE
§ 34.04.130(6) (1983). See supra note 11.
72. See International Paper Co. v. Department of Revenue, 92 Wn. 2d 277, 281, 595 P.2d 1310,
1312 (1979); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Department of Ecology, 86 Wn. 2d 310, 323, 545 P.2d 5, 13 (1976).
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carrier, 73 and whether an applicant for unemployment benefits had good
74
cause for voluntarily resigning.
When an agency's authorizing legislation grants some discretion in
choosing the means of accomplishing the agency's purposes, or defines
those purposes in extremely broad terms, the court has given the agency
more leeway in its actions. For instance, the Department of Ecology has a
broad statutory charge to protect existing water rights and the public
interest. 75 The courts have overturned the Department's decisions that deny
an amendment or application for a water permit only when the applicant
could show that the decision was an abuse of discretion. 76 Similarly, the
Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS), in an attempt to
ameliorate prison overcrowding, was granted sufficient latitude to convert a
youth honor camp into an adult honor camp as an exercise of its powers of
77
management over public institutions.
Agencies that the court views as having specialized expertise also have
often received deference on judicial review. Thus, the Shoreline Hearings
Board's decision to issue a permit that represented a compromise of the
adverse parties' positions was upheld in deference to the Board's expertise. 78 The court also has deferred to the institutional expertise of the
Utilities and Transportation Commission regarding awards for ferry contracts 79 and regarding methods for refereeing disputes on the division of
intrastate telephone revenues. 80 Finally, the court has deferred to the
expertise of both the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC),
and the Higher Education Personnel Board in solving labor disputes. 8'

73. See Farm Supply, 83 Wn. 2d at 452-53, 518 P.2d at 1240-41.
74. See Safeco Ins., 102 Wn. 2d at 395, 687 P.2d at 201-02.
75. See WASH. REv. CODE § 90.44.100 (1983).
76. See, e.g., Jensen v. Department of Ecology, 102 Wn. 2d 109, 112-13,685 P.2d 1068, 1070-71
(1984); see also Schuh v. Department of Ecology, 100 Wn. 2d 180, 186, 667 P.2d 64, 67-68 (1983).
77. See McGovern v. Department of Social & Health Serv., 94 Wn. 2d 448,453, 617 P.2d 434,437
(1980); see also State v. Rowe, 93 Wn. 2d 277, 284, 609 P.2d 1348, 1351 (1980) (standards chosen by
prosecuting attorney to enforce a particular statute not arbitrary or capricious).
78. See Portage Bay-Roanoke Park Community Council v. Shorelines Hearings Bd., 92 Wn. 2d 1.
8,593 P.2d 151, 154-55 (1979); see also Skagit County v. Department of Ecology, 93 Wn. 2d 742, 751,
613 P.2d 115, 120 (1980) (invalidating one portion of a permit, but allowing remainder of development
decision to stand).
79. See, e.g., Equitable Shipyards, Inc. v. State, 93 Wn. 2d 465,473-75, 611 P.2d 396,402 (1980)
(granting of ferry contract involves more than simple ranking of bids).
80. See, e.g., Peninsula Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Utilities & Transp. Comm'n, 89 Wn. 2d 795, 801-02,
575 P.2d 1066, 1070 (1978).
81. See, e.g., Renton Educ. Ass'n v. Public Employment Relations Comm'n, 101 Wn. 2d 435,
443-44, 680 P.2d 40, 45 (1984); Green River Community College v. Higher Educ. Personnel Bd., 95
Wn. 2d 108, 121, 622 P.2d 826, 834 (1980).
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C.

Adversely Affected Individuals

The degree to which an agency's decision disadvantages individuals also
is relevant in predicting the eventual outcome of a case. While not as
pervasive a factor as those described above, the cases reflect a subterranean
balancing of the private and public interests involved. When the prejudice
to the individual greatly outweighs the public interest asserted, the courts
may overturn an agency's decision.
In cases where private parties have met all the statutory requirements to
qualify for certain benefits, 82 or to avoid either criminal 83 or civil 84 penalties, the court has invalidated administrative regulations that would have
denied such benefits or imposed such penalties. The court also has required
certainty in administrative standards that will impose considerable burdens
on private parties. For example, where a polluter spent $35 million to
comply with pollution standards, and compliance with revised standards
would have required expenditures of approximately $20 million more, the
court enjoined the enforcement of the compliance schedule. The polluter
was allowed to delay compliance until the Environmental Protection
85
Agency (EPA) promulgated new and final standards.
These cases should be contrasted with situations in which the agency
treats an individual the same as all other applicants. For instance, the court
has upheld non-discriminatory agency denials of water permits to applicants who attempted to be processed ahead of earlier applicants. 86Also, the
court has upheld the denial of benefits to applicants who failed to meet an
unambiguous deadline. 87 The equality of treatment and countervailing
public policies persuaded the court to deny relief in these instances.
D.

JudicialReview ofAgency Rules

The court's decisions regarding the validity of administrative rules reveal
a varying intensity of review, despite the presumption of validity. 88 The
82.

E.g., Fecht v. Department of Social & Health Serv., 86 Wn. 2d 109, 110-11, 542 P.2d 780,

781-82 (1975).
83.
84.

E.g., State v. Ermert, 94 Wn. 2d 839, 847, 621 P.2d 121, 125 (1980).
State Public Disclosure Comm'n v. Rains, 87 Wn. 2d 626, 631-33,555 P.2d 1368, 1372-73

(1976).
85. ITTRayonier, Inc. v. Department ofEcology, 91 Wn. 2d 682,690-94,586P.2d 1155,1160-61
(1978). See also Malland v. Department of Retirement Sys., 103 Wn. 2d 484, 489-91, 694 P.2d 16,
21-22 (1985) (unless agency can show significant change in circumstances, collateral estoppel prevents
the relitigation of claimant's disabled status).
86. See, e.g., Jensen v. Department of Ecology, 102 Wn. 2d 109, 113-14, 685 P.2d 1068, 1071
(1984); Schuh v. Department of Ecology, 100 Wn. 2d 180, 185, 667 P.2d 64, 67-68 (1983).
87. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Department of Employment Sec., 98 Wn. 2d 846, 850-52, 658 P.2d
1240, 1243 (1983) (failure to show good cause for not filing appeal from denial of unemployment
benefits within mandatory ten day period).
88. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.

665

Washington Law Review

Vol. 60:653, 1985

intensity hinges on the type of issue presented. In general, courts look
closely for any prejudice that may have arisen from an agency's failure to
follow proper procedures in adopting rules. In contrast, courts have usually
deferred to the agency regarding the content of the rule. Thus, in the review
of agency rules, actual judicial practice tracks closely with the doctrines
announced by the legislature and the court.
An agency's failure to comply substantially with statutorily mandated
procedures results in the invalidation of the rule regardless of its contents. 89
Therefore, where an agency adopted a rule, ostensibly to comply with
federal funding requirements, the court struck down the rule because the
agency failed to make the finding required by statute as a condition
precedent to adopting the rule. 90 Failure to provide notice of intent to adopt
a rule to parties who had made adequate requests under APA standards was
another basis for invalidation. 91
The content of an agency rule has usually been given deference similar to
that afforded a statute. 92 This is particularly true when the statute being
implemented is either ambiguous or states broad remedial goals. Thus, the
Human Rights Commission could expand the meaning of sex discrimination by issuing rules prohibiting company anti-nepotism policies, except in
cases where married status had some impact on job capability. 93 Charged to
conserve the fishery resource, 94 the Department of Fisheries adopted rules
restricting the spring chinook salmon season to a single day, and was
upheld by the court. 95
When examining a rule for validity, the court uses several interpretive
aids. The rule's validity may be tested by determining the construction that
it places on the statute.96 An administrative construction adopted contemporaneously with the statute and not repudiated by the legislature will be
89. 2 F. COOPER, supra note 24, at 786.
90. Federation of State Employees v. Higher Educ. Personnel Bd., 87 Wn. 2d 823. 826-27, 557
P.2d 336, 339 (1976).
91. See, e.g., Pan Pacific Corp. v. Department of Labor & Indus., 88 Wn. 2d 347, 350-52, 560
P.2d 1141, 1143-44 (1977); see also State v. Thompson, 95 Wn. 2d 753,759, 630 P.2d 925,929 (1981)
(regulations struck down because based on statute passed through defective procedures).
92. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. While parties challenging the validity of a
statute in Washington must prove it invalid beyond a reasonable doubt, State v. Maciolek, 101 Wn. 2d
259, 263-64, 676 P.2d 996, 998 (1984), this standard has not been applied to administrative agency
regulations.
93. Washington Water Power Co. v. Human Rights Comm'n, 91 Wn. 2d 62, 69, 586 P.2d 1149.
1153-54 (1978).
94.

WASH. REV. CODE § 75.08.012 (1983).

95. Northwest Gillnetters Ass'n v. Sandison, 95 Wn. 2d 638, 648, 628 P.2d 800, 805 (1981) (rule
adopted as result of negotiations with Oregon Department of Fisheries under Columbia River Compact).
96. Washington Water Power, 91 Wn. 2d at 68-69, 586 P.2d at 1153-54.
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given some weight, 97 and this weight will increase if the legislature amends
specific sections of the statute without upsetting the administrative construction. 98 As a practical matter, subsequent legislative approval, such as
amending the statute to adopt the agency view, 99 or giving funding for the
contested project, 00 also may influence the court, even though the legislature's action occurs after the institution of a lawsuit.
III.

WASHINGTON PROPOSAL COMPARED

The Washington Bar Association formed an Administrative Law Task
Force in 1980 to study the need for legislative reform of the administrative
process.' 0 1 After research and hearings, the Task Force promulgated its
proposed revisions to the Washington APA. According to the Task Force,
one of the purposes of the Washington Proposal is to provide a clear,
statutory statement that codifies present judicial practices. 102 The scope of
review section of the Proposal is much more detailed than the present
statute, 10 3 and provides a descriptive indication of the functions to be
97. Green RiverCommunityCollegev. HigherEduc. PersonnelBd., 95 Wn. 2d 108, 118, 622P.2d
826, 832.
98. Id.
99. Overton v. Economic Assistance Auth., 96 Wn. 2d 552, 556-67, 637 P.2d 652, 655.
100. McGovern v. Department of Social & Health Serv., 94 Wn. 2d at 451, 617 P.2d at 437.
101. WASH. PROPOSAL, supra note 1, introductory comment.
102. WASH. PRoPOSAL, supranote 1, Part V comment (Judicial Review and Civil Enforcement).
The Washington Proposal contains detailed provisions regarding standing (§ 73), exhaustion of
administrative remedies (§ 74), time for filing a petition for judicial review (§ 76), and what the
petition must contain (§ 77). Each is superior to the present statute in terms of clarity. Fo; example,
§ 77is designed to guide non-attorneys in preparing a petition forjudicial review and § 74 clarifies the
law on exhaustion, a topic the present statute does not.
103. Section 85 of the WASH. PROPOSAL provides:
(1) Except to the extent that this chapter or another statute provides otherwise:
(a) The burden of demonstrating the invalidity of agency action is on the party asserting
invalidity; and
(b) The validity of agency action shall be determined in accordance with the standards of review
provided in this section, as applied to the agency action at the time it was taken.
(2) The court shall make a separate and distinct ruling on each material issue on which the court's
decision is based.
(3) The court shall grant relief only if it determines that a person seeking judicial relief has been
substantially prejudiced by any one or more of the following:
(a) The agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) The agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any provision of law;
(c) The agency has not decided all issues requiring resolution;
(d) The agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) The agency has engaged in unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to
follow prescribed procedure;
(f) The persons taking the agency action were improperly constituted as a decision-making
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performed by the court when reviewing an agency action. 104 As a result, the
Proposal would not only implement the legislature's intended goals in
passing the statute, 105 but should also give better notice to litigants and
agencies of what is necessary to prevail in a judicial review proceeding.
A.

TraditionalJudicial Powers Retained

The Proposal authorizes judicial relief from actions that are unconstitutional, are beyond the jurisdiction of an agency, and are taken without
following required procedures or through unlawful procedures. 106 These
are areas in which the court presently reserves its right to invalidate agency
actions. 107 Such judicial oversight is necessary to ensure that authority is
validly delegated and that the agencies do not exceed their statutorily
granted authority. 108 Additionally, the Proposal recognizes another trend in
present judicial practice by authorizing a remand to the agency when the
court determines that the agency has not decided all issues requiring
resolution. 109
B.

Questions of Fact

Factual determinations underlying agency actions must be "supported
by evidence that is substantial . . . in light of the whole record before the
court." 110 The section retains the requirement that the court must examine
the entire record for evidence that supports and weighs against findings of
body, were subject to disqualification, or undertook the action for reasons not predominantly
related to the authorized purposes of the agency or the merits of the controversy before it;
(g) The agency action is not supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the
whole record before the court, which includes the agency record for judicial review, supplemented
by any additional evidence received by the court under this chapter;
(h) The agency action is:
(i) Outside the range of discretion delegated to the agency by any provision of law;
(ii) Agency action, other than a rule, that is inconsistent with a rule of the agency;
(iii) Agency action, other than a rule, that is inconsistent with the agency's prior practice unless
the agency justifies the inconsistency by stating facts and reasons to demonstrate a fair and rational
basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) Arbitrary or capricious.
WASH. PROPOSAL, supra note 1, § 85.

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
See text accompanying notes 7-10.
WASH. PROPOSAL, supra note 1, § 85(3)(a),(b),(e); see supra note 103.
See supra notes 51-56.
See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.

109.
110.

WASH. PROPOSAL, supra note 1, § 85(3)(c); see supra note 103.
WASH. PROPOSAL, supra note 1, § 85(3)(g); see supra note 103.
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fact. 11'If evidence exists from which a reasoning mind could have arrived
at the finding it must be upheld. 112 This standard is in line with the supreme
court's presently deferential treatment of agency factfinding,113 and recog114
nizes the relative expertise of the agency in the factfinding process.
C.

Interpretationsand Applications of Law

The Proposal authorizes relief when an agency has incorrectly interpreted or applied the law in a particular case. This standard is clearly
superior to the present "error of law" standard, 1 5 and is also in line with
6 Despite judicial opinions that
currentjudicial practice. 11
purportedly grant
"substantial weight" 1 17 to agency interpretations of law, courts will not
hesitate to correct an agency interpretation of the law in many circum118
stances.
D.

Review of Agency Rules

The Proposal retains the present statute authorizing courts to rule on the
validity of agency regulations. 19 Thus, the procedures and doctrine surrounding the review of agency rules should remain unaltered by the
Proposal. 120 However, the Proposal is much more specific about the materials available to a court when it reviews such rules. The agency is required
111. See supra note 21.
112. WASH. PROPOSAL, supra note 1, § 85(3)(g) comment. See generallyL. JAFFE, supra note 7, at
596-98.
113. See Franklin County v. Sellers, 97 Wn. 2d 317, 325, 646 P.2d 113, 116-17 (1982).
114. The1981ModelAct§ 5-116(7) is similarto § 85(3)(g), exceptthatitprovidesforrelief when
the "agency action is based on a determination of fact tha is not supported by evidence that is
substantial." The Task Force eliminated the underscored language to allow the test to be applied "more
broadly" and "in any factual areas where a court finds it helpful." WASH. PROPOSAL, supra note 1,
§ 85(3)(g) comment. In light of the approach adopted in Sellers, which separated the factual and legal
components of mixed questions of law and fact, this change seems unnecessary and may cause
confusion as to the scope of the test. The language of the Model Act is more precise and should be
adopted instead.
115. WASH. REv. CODE § 34.04.130(6)(d) (1983); see supra note 11.
116. See supra notes 28-33, 70-74 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Sellers, 97 Wn. 2d at 325,646 P.2d at 117.
118. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text. The Proposal also provides two methods by
which an agency can clarify its interpretation of legal standards. An agency must issue an Interpretive
or Policy Statement when it would be "feasible and where useful to guide agency action and to inform
the public." WASH. PROPOSAL, supra note 1, § 21(1). This section is an innovative and original product
of the Task Force, and has no counterpart in the 1981 Model Act. Additionally, an agency must issue a
declaratory order that states whether a given statute or rule applies to a specified situation within 30 days
of receiving a request by petition. Id. § 10(5)(a). If used properly, agencies could not only make clear
statements of their positions available, but could explain the rationale behind those positions as well.
119. See WASH. REv. CODE § 34.04.070 (1983); WASH. PROPOSAL, supra note 1, § 75.
120. See supra notes 34-39, 88-100 and accompanying text.
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to maintain a rulemaking record that contains the agency's file of documents, data, and commentary received on the rule,' 2 1 and a concise
explanatory statement stating the agency's reasons for adopting the rule. 122
On judicial review, if the rule cannot be justified on the basis of those
23
reasons, the court remands the issue to the agency for reconsideration. 1
This procedure requires agencies to justify their rules before adopting
them, while giving agencies flexibility to reconsider rules that are challenged without having them invalidated by a reviewing court.

E.

Informal Action Standards

A detailed section in the Proposal governs review of informal administrative actions. 124 Informal actions may be set aside if they are "[o]utside
the range of discretion delegated to the agency." 125 This standard requires a
reviewing court to consider the institutional limitations that restrict an
agency's discretion. Since these limits are generally found in statutes and
regulations, they provide more objective criteria than the present practice
of evaluating the reasonableness of the agency action. 126
The standard of review for informal agency actions also allows relief
from any action that is inconsistent with an agency rule. 127 This approach
comports with present judicial practice. 128 In addition, the section governing informal administrative actions allows relief from agency actions that
are inconsistent with a past agency practice unless the agency can demonstrate a rational basis for the departure from that practice.129 Finally, the
traditional arbitrary or capricious standard is included in the Proposal. 130
Although the judicial role in reviewing informal agency actions is not
expanded by the Proposal, it clarifies for legal participants the functions
that courts perform in such review.
121.
WASH. PROPOSAL, supra note 1, § 25.
122. Id. § 22. A similar statement is required under WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.045 (1983). In
construing a similar statement issued according to state statute, (now codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§ 34.04.025(3) (1983)), the court found the purposes of the statement to be "(I) to assure that the
agency actually considered all arguments made, and (2) to facilitate court review." Anderson. Leech &
Morse. Inc. v. Liquor Control Bd., 89 Wn. 2d 688, 693, 575 P.2d 221. 224 (1978),
123. WASH. PROPOSAL, supra note I, § 22(2).
124. Id. § 85(3)(h). See supra note 103.
125. WASH. PROPOSAL, § 85(3)(h)(i); see supra note 103.
126. See generally Brodie & Linde, supra note 2, at 548-50.
127. WASH. PROPOSAL, supra note 1, § 85(3)(h)(ii); see supra note 103.
128. See Ritter v. Board of Comm'rs, 96 Wn. 2d 503, 507-08, 637 P.2d 940. 943-44 (198 1).
129. WASH. PROPOSAL, supra note 1, § 85(3)(h)(iii).
130. Id. § 85(3)(h)(iv).
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F.

JudicialInvestigations of Bias

The Proposal additionally deals with bias and improperly constituted
decisionmaking bodies, 131 an area not currently addressed in the APA's
scope of review section. This issue is currently handled under the "appearance of fairness" doctrine, which applies only to quasi-adjudicatory
decisions made by agencies or legislative bodies. 132 Under the appearance
of fairness doctrine, decisions will be overturned when a disinterested
party, aware of the decisionmaker's personal interests in a matter, might
reasonably believe that bias existed. 133
Under the Washington Proposal, judicial relief is allowed only when the
decisionmaking body was "improperly constituted," the decisionmakers
were "subject to disqualification," or the action was taken for "reasons not
predominantly related to the authorized purposes of the agency." 134 Two
effects would flow from the adoption of the Proposal's standard. First, since
the Proposal's scope of review standards apply to all "agency actions,"135
the prohibition against bias would extend to informal agency actions as well
as adjudications and rulemaking. 136 Although this standard would apply to
a wider range of agency actions, the second effect of the Proposal is to
narrow judicial inquiry when fairness challenges are raised by prescribing
more objective standards.
This narrower scope of inquiry is consistent with the traditional judicial
reluctance to inquire into the mental processes of agency decisionmakers. 137 The Proposal standard clarifies the permissible grounds for
invalidation in quasi-judicial proceedings by applying the standards already applied to judges. 138 By confining the inquiry to these established
standards, the Proposal limits the confusion that has surrounded the
139
nebulous appearance of fairness doctrine.
131. Id. § 85(3)(f).
132. See Zehring v. Bellevue, 99 Wn. 2d 488, 494, 663 P.2d 823,826 (1983). But the restriction of
the doctrine was put in question by this decision, as the court also indicated that the doctrine applies
whenever a public hearing is required by statute. See id. at 499-50, 663 P.2d at 829-30 (Utter, J.,
dissenting). The court has recently recognized the harsh criticism of this doctrine. Harris v. Hornbaker,
98 Wn. 2d 650, 658 n. 1, 658 P.2d 1219, 1222 n. 1(1983). See generallyVache, AppearanceofFairness,
Doctrine or Delusion, 13 WnLAmErm L.J. 479 (1977).
133. Zehring, 99 Wn.2d at 494, 663 P.2d at 826.
134. WASH. PROPoSAL, supra note 1, § 85(3)(f.
135. Id. § 1(2).
136. Cf. Harris, 98 Wn. 2d at 657, 658 P.2d at 1221-22 (appearance of fairness doctrine applies
only to quasi-adjudicatory decisions).
137. See United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409,420 (1941). But cf Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (inquiry into mental processes of decisionmaker allowed).
138. Harris,98 Wn. 2d at 665-66, 658 P.2d at 1228-29 (Utter, J., concurring); see also Medical
Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnston, 99 Wn. 2d 466, 483-85, 663 P.2d 457, 466-67 (1983) (Utter, J.,
concurring).
139. Zehring, 99 Wn. 2d at 500, 663 P.2d at 829-30 (Utter, J., dissenting).
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CONCLUSION

Defining the relationship between courts and administrative agencies is a
crucial task that cannot be accomplished with cryptic provisions in a scope
of review statute. Washington courts have adopted the traditional doctrines
regarding judicial review of agency actions, based primarily on the distinction between facts and law. However, case analysis reveals several factors
that motivate courts to review agency action with greater or lesser intensity.
The combination of those factors present in a case are helpful in predicting
whether the court will invalidate or uphold agency actions. The scope of
review section of the Washington Proposal provides a more definite statement of the functions that courts perform when reviewing agency actions.
Additionally, it promotes the legislature's goals of clarity, uniformity, and
predictabilty. The legislature should therefore adopt this clarification of
Washington law.
Tim J. Filer
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